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CASE NOTES
The decision of this court has provided the first adjudication of the
legality of an "agency shop" clause under the Indiana Right-To-Work
Act. However, the importance of this decision will extend far beyond
the State of Indiana. Other states which are now considering the adoption
of Right-To-Work laws will have to consider this decision when framing
their proposed enactments. As pointed out by this Indiana court, if
legislators seek to prohibit the "agency shop," then they must manifest
this intent by clearly stating such prohibitions in the statute.
What effect this decision will have on the decisions of other states
with similar statutes is difficult to foresee. In these states, unions will defi-
nitely seek to negotiate similar provisions so as to test their respective
statutes. Just two months after the Meade decision, the Attorney Gen-
eral of North Dakota issued an opinion on "agency shop" clauses and
referred to this Indiana decision. 15 He concurred with the Meade opinion
as to their validity, however, he suggested the charge to nonunion em-
ployees for union representation should only be on the basis of actual
cost of such representation. The fundamental reasoning used by the In-
diana court in deciding the legality of the "agency shop" clause has pro-
vided a sound basis. for other courts to deal with this same problem in
the future.
15 N.D. Arty. Gen. Opin. (August 24, 1959).
LABOR LAW-UNION SHOP CLAUSE VIOLATES
FREEDOM OF SPEECH WHERE FUNDS
USED FOR IDEOLOGICAL PURPOSES
S. B. Street was employed for many years by one of the defendant rail-
roads. Subsequent to employing Street, defendant railroad entered into
a labor contract with the defendant union, the authorized collective bar-
gaining representative for employees of the railroad within the provisions
of the Railway Labor Act.' The contract provided for a union shop,
which made union membership a condition of continued employment and
would have required Street to join the union. A substantial part of the
dues, fees, and assessments which the plaintiffs were to be required to
'45 U.S.C.A. S 152(11) (Supp., 1958) provides: "Notwithstanding any other pro-
visions of this chapter, or of any other statute or law of the United States, or Territory
thereof, or of any State, any carrier or carriers as defined in this chapter and a labor
organization or labor organizations duly designated and authorized to represent em-
ployees in accordance with the requirements of this chapter shall be permitted (a) to
make agreements, requiring, as a condition of continued employment, that within
sixty days following the beginning of such employment, or the effective date of such
agreements, whichever is the later, all employees shall become members of the labor
organization representing their craft or class:"
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pay to the union would have been used on the local, regional and national
levels of organized labor, to support ideologies, legislation, economic pro-
grams and political candidates which the plaintiffs not only did not
approve, but directly opposed. The plaintiffs sought to enjoin defendant
railroad and defendant union from enforcing the contract. The trial court
found that the use of monies so exacted from the plaintiffs was contrary
to the Constitution, law and public policy of Georgia and enforcement
of the legislation which allowed such practices would violate the First,
Fifth, Ninth and Tenth Amendments to the United States Constitution,
which protect individuals from unwarranted invasion of their personal
and property rights under the cloak of federal authority. The lower court
enjoined the defendants from enforcing the contract. Upon appeal, the
Supreme Court of Georgia, in a unanimous decision, affirmed the decision
of the lower court on the grounds that such use of funds so exacted from
the plaintiffs would violate their rights to freedom of speech and deprive
them of property without due process of law. International Assn. of
Machinists v. Street, 108 S.E.2d 796 (Ga., 1959).
The major question in the Street case is whether the guaranty to free
speech is violated by such use of funds acquired under a union shop agree-
ment. This problem does not appear to have been directly adjudicated
prior to this case. Two other cases, involving similar factual situations
have reached courts of last resort. In Railway Employees' Department v.
Hanson2 the United States Supreme Court held that the union shop sec-
tion of the Railway Labor Act was constitutional and did not violate the
First and Fifth Amendments, because requiring financial support of col-
lective bargaining from all who derive benefits from it is within the power
of Congress under the commerce clause.8 The court also held that the
union shop is a matter of policy and therefore within the province of
Congress, not the Supreme Court.4 However, Mr. Justice Douglas stated
quite pointedly that the decision that the union shop was constitutional
was not meant to prejudice the decision in any case involving imposition
of conditions to union membership other than periodic dues, initiation
fees, and assessments, or involving use of compulsory membership to im-
pair freedom of expression, and that such judgment was withheld there
because the facts in the case did not give rise to such a question.
Another case where the plaintiffs sought to enjoin the enforcement
of a union shop contract was heard in the Texas Supreme Court. Follow-
ing the precedent in the Hanson case, the court did not grant the injunc-
2 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
3 U.S. Const. Art. I, S 8, cl. 3.
4 Cf. Local 1976 United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America v.
N.L.R.B., 357 U.S. 93 (1958).
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tion.5 However, the majority opinion in this case explains an important
part of the Hanson case. It says that Congress in allowing the union shop
sought only to remedy the "free rider" problem, so that all who received
benefits of collective bargaining would be made to share in its support,
and that the terms dues, fees, and assessments appearing in the statute
meant only those funds necessary to defray the permanent cost of col-
lective bargaining.
One purpose of the Railway Labor Act is to aid in the free flow of
interstate commerce. 6 Under the commerce power, Congress has the
power to enact all appropriate legislation for the protection, advance-
ment and safety of interstate commerce and may adopt measures which
foster, protect, control and restrain such commerce. 7 There is a serious
doubt as to whether the Georgia courts could enjoin the enforcement of
the contract on the grounds that the union shop provision thereof violated
the laws of Georgia. The decision in the Hanson case stated that a union
agreement made pursuant to the Railway Labor Act has the imprimatur
of the federal law upon it and, by the force of the Supremacy Clause of
Article VI of the Constitution, cannot be made illegal nor vitiated by any
provisions of a state's laws." Therefore, the substantive law question
which remains is whether the union shop clause in the contract authorized
by the Railway Labor Act violates the plaintiffs' rights under the Federal
Constitution.
The right of freedom to contract has been abridged by Congress' exer-
cise of its power to regulate commerce. The United States Supreme Court
has held that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments are not guaranties
of untrammeled freedom to contract and to act; and Congress, in exer-
cising its power to regulate commerce can subject both to restraints not
shown to be unreasonable. 9 The Fifth Amendment does not prohibit
governmental regulation for public welfare, but merely demands that law
shall be reasonable and not arbitrary, or capricious, and that the means
chosen shall have real and substantial value to the ends sought to be
attained.' ° At this point precedent might indicate that the union shop
5 Sandsberry v. International Assn. of Machinists, 156 Tex. 340, 295 S.W.2d 412 (1956).
6 45 U.S.CA. § 151a (Supp., 1958).
7N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Lauglin Steel Corporation, 301 U.S. 1 (1937); Texas & N.O.R.
Co. v. Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship Clerks, 281 U.S. 548 (1930).
8 Railway Employees' Dept. v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
9 Virginian Ry. Co. v. System Federation No. 40, 300 U.S. 515 (1937); Tagg Brothers
and Morehead v. United States, 280 U.S. 420 (1930) in which the Supreme Court held
that fixing of maximum rates which could be charged by commission brokers in the
Union Stockyards was not a violation of due process as guaranteed by the Fifth Amend-
ment.
10 Nebbia v. New York. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
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provision of the Railway Labor Act does not unreasonably violate an
employee's right to contract. Further, infringement which might occur
would be a reasonable exercise of Congress' power to regulate interstate
commerce.
The more difficult point to resolve is whether freedom of speech is
violated by the use of funds, collected under a union shop clause, to sup-
port programs which the plaintiffs oppose. Our courts have realized that
in certain instances the right of free speech must be abridged in order to
maintain our security. The United States Supreme Court has stated that
although the right of freedom of speech is fundamental, it is not absolute.
In Whitney v. California," speaking of the rights of free speech and
assembly, Mr. Justice Brandeis said: "Their exercise is subject to restric-
tion, if the particular restriction proposed is required in order to protect
the State from destruction or from serious injury, political, economic, or
moral. '12 There are many cases where freedom of speech has been re-
stricted by labor legislation, but most of these cases deal with preventing
employers from using coercive language to dissuade employees from exer-
cising their collective bargaining rights.13
When this case or a case involving similar facts and presenting the
same issue reaches the United States Supreme Court, it is highly possible
that the decision will not support the holding of the Georgia courts. This
decision seems to go against the trend found in the Supreme Court deci-
sions and would cause great repercussions in organized labor which would
be adverse to the general welfare of the nation. For these reasons it does
not seem probable that this decision will be affirmed by the Supreme Court
of the United States.
11 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
12 Ibid., at 373 (emphasis supplied).
1a N.L.R.B. v. Bailey, 180 F.2d 278 (C.A. 6th, 1950); N.L.R.B. v. Kropp Forge, 178
F.2d 822 (C.A. 7th, 1949); N.L.R.B. v. Winona Textile Mills, 160 F.2d 201 (C.C.A. 8th,
1947); N.L.R.B. v. American Tube Bending, 134 F.2d 993 (C.C.A.2d, 1943).
PROCEDURE-FOREIGN CORPORATION HELD NOT SUB-
JECT TO ILLINOIS JURISDICTION UNDER CIVIL
PRACTICE ACT, SECTION SEVENTEEN, UNLESS
PHYSICALLY PRESENT WHEN "DOING
BUSINESS" IN ILLINOIS
In 1953, after a series of negotiations at plaintiff's office in Chicago,
between defendant, a New York manufacturing corporation not licensed
to do business in Illinois, and plaintiff, an Illinois distributor of office
machines, a contract was allegedly entered into, the terms of which were
stated in a letter sent from defendant in New York to plaintiff in Illinois.
